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LUIOTIX, OT/IoT probe · sovereign IoT / OT monitoring

The plant floor watched, without ever leaving the site. OT/IoT solution.

PLCs, cameras, building management, refrigeration plant, medical devices: the OT/IoT probe discovers and monitors what is plugged into your industrial network, listening only. Not one packet sent to your equipment, no data sent out, and it can be checked at your firewall.

LUIOTIX, in pictures
Listening only on the mirror port, inventory observed or deduced, gap with the declared inventory, record signed twice. Silent video, on a loop. Illustrated scenes with fictitious data.
Frameworks addressedNIS2DORAISO/IEC 27001MITRE ATT&CKIEC 62443NIST CSFCRAISO/IEC 27090ANSSI

Why OT resists

Three reasons your SOC cannot see the plant floor

These are not signs of neglect. They are real constraints, and our probe is built around all three.

Your PLCs do not speak to a SIEM

A PLC generally emits neither syslog nor Windows events. What concerns it is read on the wire, over Modbus, S7 or EtherNet/IP, or it is not read at all.

An active scan can take a line down

Many industrial devices tolerate unexpected solicitation badly. The probe sends none: it listens on a mirror port, and nothing else.

A cloud update reopens the network

Updating a vulnerability database from a vendor's cloud forces an outbound flow from a network meant to be isolated. The probe takes the other road: a signed pack, loaded offline.

What the inventory does not say

What should I be hearing, and am not?

“What did I detect?” is an easier question than its reverse, and it is the reverse one that matters here. A passive probe only sees the traffic crossing its mirror port: a SPAN on the wrong switch, a cell behind an unmirrored switch, a forgotten VLAN, and the tool displays an apparently complete inventory. Give it your declared estate, and it compares both ways.

DiagramReconciling the declared estate with what the probe hears
Reconciling the declared estate with what the probe hears Two sources are compared: the declared inventory, a CSV of 42 devices, and what the probe actually heard on the mirror port, 38 devices. The comparison gives five rows: 34 seen and declared, 5 never heard, 3 silent on this run, 4 off inventory and 2 in disagreement. Without a declared inventory, the result shown is not “0 gaps” but “not compared”. DECLARED INVENTORY 42 your CSV: one mandatory column, the MAC address MIRROR PORT 38 what the probe actually heard Seen and declaredboth sources agree34 Never hearddeclared, not one packet: probe blind spot or hardware gone5 Silent on this runknown from earlier runs, quiet today3 Off inventoryheard, absent from your declared estate4 Disagreementfirmware, vendor or model: the two sources differ2 Without a declared inventory, the probe never shows “0 gaps”: it shows NOT COMPARED, on every run. DECLARED INVENTORY42your CSV:one mandatory column, the MAC addressMIRROR PORT38what the probe actually heardSeen and declaredboth sources agree34Never hearddeclared, not one packet: probe blind spotor hardware gone5Silent on this runknown from earlier runs, quiet today3Off inventoryheard, absent from your declared estate4Disagreementfirmware, vendor or model: the twosources differ2Without a declared inventory, the probenever shows “0 gaps”: it shows NOT COMPARED,on every run.
A zero reads as a clean bill of health, and there is none to give until you have said what you own. Likewise, “never heard” does not assert a disappearance: the probe only establishes its own silence, and that is already the missing information.

Zero gaps holds for the declared perimeter, and for that alone. A device absent from your inventory and from the mirror port stays invisible on both sides. The record says so, rather than letting you conclude.

What the probe can do

Passive throughout, and precise all the same

Listening without emitting means extracting the most from what passes. Here is what the probe gets.

Protocol identification (DPI)

Discovery says “this device exposes Modbus”. DPI says “Schneider PLC BMEP582040, revision 2.10”, by reading the answers the device already gives: Modbus Read Device Identification, EtherNet/IP List Identity, S7comm SZL. Without a model and a firmware version, no match against an ICS-CERT advisory is credible.

Vendor resolved offline

The IEEE OUI database is embedded: resolving a MAC address to a vendor triggers no request. It is a deduction, not an observation, since a MAC prefix can be spoofed with one command. The record tells the two apart everywhere.

Vulnerabilities by signed offline pack

The pack is signed twice, with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, and verified before being believed: an unsigned, tampered or unknown-key pack is refused, never “loaded with a warning”. EUVD comes first (the European database run by ENISA and established by NIS2), with CERT-FR and ICS-CERT additions. It arrives on a USB stick or an internal mirror.

Matching with stated confidence

Every device ↔ vulnerability match carries its level: confirmed (version within the affected range), probable (product affected, version unknown), to verify, always with the reason. Only a confirmed match weighs on the risk posture.

First conversation between two devices

Monitoring a device says what changes about it. It says nothing about the link: who talks to whom. Yet to reach a PLC you have to talk to it, and that is the one thing an attacker cannot avoid. The probe compares observed conversations to those it knows and flags the new ones, with the level distance crossed.

Behavioural, and honest about its limits

An industrial network is remarkably regular: a PLC polls at a fixed rate, talks to a handful of peers, for years. A deviation is therefore significant, where office traffic is legitimately erratic. Robust statistics (median and MAD), and silence while the learned baseline is too thin: no alert invented on three data points.

Reachable from outside, or calling outside

These are not the same finding. A device calling out is a leak; a device reachable from outside is a door, and that is how a PLC gets reached. The probe separates both directions and names the kind of address. « Outside » does not mean « the Internet »: a carrier's shared address space and tunnels are included, because that is how remote maintenance arrives over a mobile backup link.

The maintenance access you declare

On refrigeration, HVAC or medical estates, remote access is the rule: a handful of technicians covers hundreds of sites. The useful question is not how to forbid it, it is which one was expected. You declare your contractors and the scope of each, and the probe says, of every inbound session, whether it was expected, out of scope, or unknown. No third party is discovered: you alone know your contracts. Without a declaration, sessions are recorded and not compared, and the report says so.

End of support, the risk nobody counts

A controller lasts 10 to 15 years and receives patches for 5 or 6. A device with no known flaw but abandoned six years ago counted as zero, while it is in practice the most exposed: the next flaw that hits it will have no patch. The signed pack therefore carries end-of-support dates, with their source. A product missing from that list is not a supported product, it is an unrecorded one, and it is counted as such.

Hundreds of sites, one view, nothing leaving

An estate of stores or branches often has a single managed box per site. For remote access, the uplink is the right listening point, and the probe writes it into its caveats: the report then covers what enters and leaves the site, and nothing of internal conversations. Each site produces its signed report, and one tool consolidates them on your side, verifying every signature. It rejects and names whatever fails, and above all it names the sites that sent nothing: a silent site is the one to look at.

Live capture, unable to emit

On Linux, capture uses AF_PACKET, bounded in duration and volume. The socket is opened read-only and the privilege is dropped as soon as the socket is open. Otherwise a plain PCAP file is enough.

Console and report, without a byte from elsewhere

The local console listens on 127.0.0.1, read-only. The HTML report is self-contained: opening it on an isolated machine produces no traffic, because it calls no external resource.

Segmentation

Purdue levels, and your auditor's vocabulary

A well-designed industrial network is segmented into levels: the Purdue model, the sector's common grammar. The probe spots boundary crossings: an office workstation talking straight to a PLC without passing through the DMZ, an OT device reaching out to the Internet.

Each finding is translated into IEC 62443 vocabulary (FR1 to FR7), so the conversation with the auditor starts from the same word.

The Purdue levels, a passive probe, and a suspicious first conversation Six levels of the Purdue model, from enterprise to process. A passive probe listens on a mirror port. An office workstation talks to a controller for the first time: the crossing is flagged. A declared but never-heard device is marked. L4-5Enterpriseoffice, internet L3.5Industrial DMZthe mandatory airlock L3OperationsMES, historians L2SupervisionSCADA, HMI L1Controlcontrollers (PLC) L0Processsensors, actuators HR laptop S7-1200 first conversation L4 → L1 PROBE · mirror port never heard declared in the inventory, absent from the mirror: probe blind spot L4-5Enterpriseoffice, internetL3.5Industrial DMZthe mandatory airlockL3OperationsMES, historiansL2SupervisionSCADA, HMIL1Controlcontrollers (PLC)L0Processsensors, actuatorsHR laptopS7-1200never heardPROBE · mirror portfirst conversation L4 → L1declared in the inventory, absent from the mirror:probe blind spot
LUIOTIX does not claim a device is absent, only that none of its packets reach it. It therefore puts the unmirrored segment before the missing hardware, and counts separately what it did not hear: declared never seen, silent on this run, heard outside the inventory.

Our method

Six questions, and what we answer

The established platforms are richer in integrations, and older. We do not answer in their place: here are our answers, verifiable one by one.

QuestionWhat the probe answers
Vulnerability updates✓Signed offline pack, carried on a USB stick, fail-closed
Discovery✓Entirely passive: not one packet sent to your equipment
What the probe cannot hear✓Reconciled with your declared estate, and “not compared” while it is missing
The framework applied✓IEC 62443 for what drives a process, ETSI EN 303 645 for the connected device
Proof for the auditor✓Record signed with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65, verified offline with your keys
A device's identity✓Observed or deduced, told apart everywhere, since a MAC prefix is spoofable

Scope

What the probe does not do

  • It blocks nothing. It is an observation probe, not a firewall or an IPS. It watches and never interrupts a process.
  • It does not scan. What does not cross the mirror port does not exist for it. That is exactly why reconciliation exists.
  • It does not hold the door on remote access. The probe records that an inbound session took place and says whether you had declared it. It does not authenticate technicians, does not keep device passwords and does not record sessions: all of that requires sitting inline and holding secrets, two things a listen-only probe must not do.
  • It does not replace your control engineer. Risk findings inform a decision, they do not take it.
  • It is not certified. It speaks the vocabulary of IEC 62443 and ETSI EN 303 645, but it attests to no compliance on your behalf.

What it does, it does verifiably.

The private key is yours, not ours

The record attests “this document comes from this probe and has not been modified”. If the vendor held the key, it would have to be deployed on every probe shipped, and a distributed private key is no longer private. We do not sign your records, and your auditor does not need us to read them.

The reserves field is never empty, and the first one is always the same: a passive probe only observes the traffic on its mirror port. Then come the uncompared estate, the devices never heard, an unsigned pack, the absence of declared zones. And the content digest ignores the generation timestamp: two records produced at two moments from the same capture yield the same digest, so your auditor compares month to month knowing nothing about cryptography.

The proof

A record your auditor verifies without us

An HTML report can be read, but it cannot be proven. Anyone opens it in an editor and changes a figure. Before NIS2, before an IEC 62443 review, before an insurer, a console export is worth only the trust placed in whoever produced it. And nobody should have to grant that trust.

Two solutions, one doctrine

The probe and LUAXERR: distinct, and built to get along

The OT/IoT probe is a solution in its own right: it installs, runs and is verified without LUAXERR. It shares the same doctrine (local by principle, deterministic first, honest about what it does not know) because the same hand writes it.

When both solutions are in place

When both are present, the bridge is by contract: the probe translates its changes and high risks into LUAXERR's pivot schema and pushes them. The plant floor → SOC → regulatory obligation chain is then complete. That bridge is optional: without a URL, it is inert.

One capture, and you will know what your probe cannot hear

The shortest way to judge: a PCAP of your network, your declared estate as a CSV, and a signed record in return. Nothing leaves your premises.

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